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THE PHILOSOPHIC STUDY OF RELIGION.
BY GEORGE A. BARROW.
THE age of the opposition of religion to philosophy has gone by
;
not, however, as has been sometimes said, to give place to an
era of good feeling, which is virtually a triumph for the philos-
opher, but to be succeeded by a period of indifference to pJiilosophy.
The religious leader of to-day does not oppose, he disregards, phi-
losophy. Academic circles have not recognized this to any extent,
but to an outsider nothing is more marked than the weariness of
even educated laymen with any form of philosophical discussion.
They care less for it than they do for the old dogmatic sermons of
our fathers. The movement of our religious and church life to-day
is more practical, we say, and rightly. I do not, however, believe
that this is due to any depreciation of philosophy on the part of the
religious man, but only to the feeling that the philosopher has not con-
sidered him. The study I have undertaken in this paper is to find
and set forth the explanation of this disregard.
In the modern philosophical study of religion there are three
directions of advance. The interest that undoubtedly does exist
on the part of the student of philosophy towards religion takes the
form either of a study of theism, of the science of religion, or of
the philosophy of religion. Theism exists either as the philosophic
form of orthodox theology, or as the philosophic construction of
monism or absolutism. In the first case we have the same attitude
to religion whether we are dealing with an advocate of the idea
of a divine revelation above reason, or with a man who draws his
arguments for that revelation from current philosophy. In each
case we are dealing with the support of an already formed system,
and all that can be done is to improve the arguments for that system.
Reconstructions there have been, but advance does not seem to re-
sult. This form of theism is forever on the defensive. There is,
next, constructive philosophical monism or absolutism in its many
forms. Progress here is continuous, so continuous that we wonder
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at times if any two ages will have the same idea of God. For these
men, of whom Royce may be taken as one of the best representa-
tives, God is believed in in order to explain the universe, or at least
the constitution of the universe. He is a theoretical construction
of a higher order, but used much as atoms are used in science.
Different in scope and aim is the science of religion. I use
this term because it is convenient, waiving the question as to how
far that science may be descriptive and how far normative. The
interest here is either on the individual or on the religious forms.
In the first case we have men like James, Pratt,—and the Worcester
school generally— , and in the second the study of comparative re-
ligions. So far as this study is purely historical and descriptive,
we can not call it philosophic, but there is in each case the method
of analysis and of valuation of the elements found. This valuation,
however, is on the basis of effectiveness, not of belief. For instance
mysticism is studied and valued for its effect on emotions, morals,
etc., not for the correctness of its theological belief. As James
points out, these beliefs may be exactly opposed. In the comparison
of religions the question, which is the more correct, is not raised.
There remains finally the third method of what I have called
the philosophy of religion. This studies the religious experience,
the religious beliefs, and the religious demands and attempts to
value them according to their truth. It takes mysticism, for instance,
and considers it not only as a phenomenon of human life, but asks
whether its method of reaching God is valid, and whether God is
such a being that He can be reached in that way. I am not claiming
that it is the crowm of the sciences or even of philosophy. As one's
metaphysics varies, so will one's philosophy of religion, and a varia-
tion in the valuation of religious truth must have its effect on one's
metaphysics.
One thing is of importance, the philosophy of religion studies
the religious assertions and demands as well as the religious emotions
and religious forms. There have been attempts, of course, to limit
the philosophy of religion either to an additional argument for the-
ism, or to a critical account of religious phenomena. Any philo-
sophic criticism, however, nmst go further than bolstering up re-
ceived views, or describing and explaining phenomena. Religion
as a phenomenon is the subject not of philosophy but of science.
The subjective side, the tests of truth and the demand for a valua-
tion in terms of truth are the legitimate field' for a philosophic
critique.
The religious consciousness always asserts that it feels or knows
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the presence of a power other than itself. It is not sufficient to
argue at once as theism does that this is God, then proceed to argue
for God's existence, nor does it cover the whole field to study
that consciousness or its expression in ritual and history. We must
carefully analyze the elements in that consciousness, and ask their
truth, and validity. To this task few have set themselves, and little
has been done. It may be said that the way is not yet prepared, but
we do not need to wait for a perfect science before constructing our
philosophy. So some advance has been made in this direction, but
awakens very little interest from the technical philosopher.
Of the three main lines of the study of religion which we have
outlined, theism would seem to satisfy easily the religious man. It
is built up on the foundation of his beliefs, and uses its energies in
arguing for those beliefs. It needs, however, but little study of the
history of theology to convince us that these beliefs are not deduc-
tions from the experience itself. They have been evolved in re-
sponse to religious demands, but mixed in is much of ancient science
and more of ancient philosophy.
The great Calvinistic system is plainly indebted to the current
legal conceptions for its conception of the atonement, and the doc-
trine of the Trinity owes its present form mainly to the ideas and
terms brought over from Greek philosophy. All this is looked at
from the point of view of the religious need, but it interprets about
as truly his legal or scientific need as it does the demands of his
religious nature.
The theories of God as creator are a good example of this. The
underlying religious demand is for a power in which the man may
put absolute trust, therefore he seeks omnipotence in his God. When
we study the ideas of God's omnipotence, however, we find that it
involves about as much argument concerning a first cause, which is
scientific, or an all knower, which is epistemological, or arguments
from analogy. In no case, so far as I know, is there an inquiry into
the sense in which the religious need for a firm foundation requires
an omnipotent God, and then less still is there an interest on the
part of theism to establish this foundation by a conclusive proof.
Instead we have the effort to establish ideas of God wdiich we have
inherited from Jew and Greek. It is because orthodox theism does
not study religion that men are turning away from it.
With philosophic theism the case is still plainer. One has onlv
to glance through the current discussions in philosophical circles as
to the nature of the Absolute, or as to his existence, to realize that
religion is not in even the fringe of consciousness. The absolutist
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and monistic systems need some one principle or idea to complete
and bind together their system, and because historically that one
principle has been called God. they call their One or Absolute by the
religious name. It is neither based on an analysis of the religious
experience or demand, nor does it aim to establish a foundation for
that experience. Of course such a foundation may be laid in agree-
ment with an absolutist system but the current discussions are not
attempting to lay this foundation. The man who feels within himself
something that is called the influence of God, and seeks to find
whether God, the God of philosophical theism, can become known
to him in such an experience, finds no answer. Such a problem is
not even considered by current philosophy. It is no wonder, then,
that here also, the religious man feels little concern with philosophy.
The science of religion, the second line of approach which I
outlined, comes closer to the religious man. It takes account of the
religious experience, and studies it. Yet, of the two, the religious
consciousness is more interested in theism than in the descriptive
studies which are now being made. . The religious leaders may feel
a certain interest in the average age of conversion, but it is more
curiosity than concern. I have had certain theories as to the proper
age for confirmation, but in practice that theory has been broken as
often as it has been kept under pressure of other factors. This is
almost, I might say, quite, universal.
The religious leader is not concerned with the average but with
what is best for the individual. The study of the experience follows,
but does not help, the course of that experience. We cannot go
by the analogy of the natural sciences and say that the study of
phenomena must react on the use of phenomena. The science of
religion which is analogous to physics or chemistry is found in the
experience and methods of the churches, not in the work of James
or Pratt. These latter are not seeking to construct a working science,
but to explain the phenomena of religion. This study may and will
advance, and have some effect on the work of the religious leader,
but the man who has the experience, and is concerned with it only in
himself, not in inducing it in others, does not turn to the science
of religion for help. He does not need a description, he knows it
far better than any description can express it, nor does he care for
its expression in others. What he is concerned with is, can he trust
this experience? Will it lead him to right action? will it free him
from the weaknesses of his character? Such work as has been done
has a place, but since it does not try to answer these questions, the
seeker after the truth of religion passes it by.
THE PfllLOSOPHIC STUDY OF RELIGION. 569
The study of the types or history of rehgion comes closer to the
religious need, not as philosophy, but as history. A partial answer
to the truth or the expression and forms of religion is given in his-
tory, and by the study of what other men have done and felt. This
however is not philosophy. The study of other religions awakens
far more interest to-day than does the philosophy of our own. This
was the one thing that impressed me most at the recent missionary
exposition in Boston. Doctrine, the city as a whole cared little for,
but account of the ways and thoughts of men of other religions
awakened a ready interest. This was not entirely, by any means,
the curiosity for anything new. but was very largely a discriminating
interest in other expressions of religion. Yet this could have but
one result, to awaken the question which the history of religions
can not solve, which is the true belief and the true expression, or
is there any one truth in religion? These questions belong to phi-
losophy, and their answer must come from philosophy.
The truth of this indifference of philosophy to the claims of
religion may be admitted, and yet the whole matter be regarded as
only another case of the followers of a special line of study claiming
for themselves the center of the field. If we claimed, as some have
done, that theology was the queen of the sciences or the crown of
philosophy, this would have some truth in it. Such is not in the
least my contention. In the first place I am not arguing for what
should be, but only explaining what is, the indifference of the edu-
cated religious man to the philosophical study of his religious ex-
perience.
If philosophy took the stand that it was not interested in the
special fields of practical human activity, but remained always ab-
stract, then none could complain of its attitude toward religion. But
it is interested in religion, as the activity put into theism and into
the psychology of religion proves. Nor can it be said that the stu-
dents of philosophy are pursuing the more important line of inquiry
for religion. The most important, to the one professing to be re-
ligious, of the aspects of religion is its connection with morality,
and to this both psychology and ethics contribute nothing. Modern
ethics does consider the claims and need of the moral life, but no-
where is that which is for so many the dynamic power of morality,
religion, given adequate consideration. This has not been true in the
past, for the Kantian movement as a whole has taken religion into
account, but the modern rush after the practical has passed by w'hat
is for many, probably without question for a majority of the world
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to-day, one of the most practical concerns of life, the effort to escape
from sin and its consequences.
The modern pragniatists and humanists must relearn the old
lesson, that we cannot solve prohlems by ignoring them, and the
problem that religion raises must be solved. In its outline I have
already stated it : does that emotion, or feeling, or experience, which
we call religion, have its roots in the world of reality ; can there
be an assurance of escape from what we feel and call sin ; is the
moral life something based on the nature of the universe, and has
it the backing of the powers of the universe, or is it something
passing, and not obligatory on man.
These are the practical questions which the religious man asks
of philosophy, and they are not being answered, nor is an answer
sought, by the bulk of the students of the philosophy or science
of religion.
Finally, I wish again to make clear the relation of such a study
as I have indicated, to the other work of the student of philosophy.
It falls midway between ethics and metaphysics. The questions
concerned with the nature of the moral life lap over into the field
of ethics, but with a different purpose than to establish the nature
of any particular ethical system. The question is general, as to the
meaning of any ethical life. Then we have the problem of how far
other forces than those of reason reinforce the impulses toward
morality. Reason really plays little part in conduct, therefore if the
forces that affect action are not fundamental to life, morality has
little lasting power, no matter how reasonable it may be. This is
not, however, a biological study of the evolution of morality. Such
a study reveals no more whether morality be a permanent element in
life than it does whether the instincts of the bee are the passing or
permanent expression of the forces which evolved bees. The most
a natural science can do is to describe and correlate. What the
study of religion needs is analysis of the moral and religious life,
and then the consideration of whether the principles of existence re-
quire morality and are aided by religion. When this neglected
field is covered, the present indifference of religion to philosophy
will disappear, and philosophy regain once more her true place in the
esteem of the religious man.
EDITORIAL COMMENT.
The Rev. George A. Barrow, of Chelsea, Mass., stands in the
midst of practical church life, and is in direct touch with religious
people. He must know what he states when he says : "The religious
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leader of to-day does not oppose, he disregards, philosophy," and
this sounds hke a reproach to the philosopher who is blamed for not
entering into the deep significance of religions sentiment. To some
extent his strictures seem to us unfair for philosophers are giving
more thought to religious experience and the importance of religious
life than ever before; but we must recognize that most of these in-
vestigations are of a scientific nature and are disregarded by faith-
ful believers who are neither willing nor able to investigate their
own state of mind. Mr. Barrow informs us that the question of the
faithful is not answered directly by psychological and philological
inquiries into religious experience. The religious man wants to
know : "Does that emotion, or feeling, or experience, which we call
religion, have its roots in the world of reality ; can there be an as-
surance of escape from what we feel and call sin ; is the moral life
something based on the nature of the universe, and has it the backing
of the powers of the universe, or is it something passing and not
obligatory on man?"
We would answer these questions in brief: (1) Religious ex-
perience has its roots in reality; (2) it helps man to overcome what
in a religious term is called sin; (3) it is indeed backed by the cos-
mic constitution of the world, and (4) it refers not to anything
accidental or indififerent, but conveys directions which are obligatory
on man. In other words man as an individual feels the insufficiency
of his nature, and as the gravity in every material principle indicates
its interrelation with the totality of existence, so in the domain of
sentiency every being is animated by the feeling which seeks the
solution of its life problem outside of itself. This general feeling
which grows from universal interrelations of everything that exists,
we have characterized as a panpathy or all-feeling. From this re-
ligion grows all emotion, appearing first in those instincts which are
characterized as conscious, imposing certain duties upon man's life.
The development of religion accordingly depends upon the world-
conception, and it naturally rises from dim and uncultured views
of the powers that sway us to a pure and scientific conception of
the universe.
Primitive religion is naturally mythical. It changes into a
symbolical dogmatism and will finally reach the stage of a purely
scientific world-conception, but we must insist that in attaining its
highest phase it does not disown its prior preparatory phases, for
the truths contained in myths do not become untrue by reaching a
state of clearness, and before we can see truth face to face we will
naturally see it as through a glass darkly.
